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TThe mention of Puerto Rico once  conjured visions of a tropical tax  paradise, complete with pristine beaches and overproof rum. While the beaches and rum remain, the island’s increasing resemblance  to debt-ridden Detroit, fiscally  
irresponsible Argentina, and  
austerity-bludgeoned Greece is 
enough to make all but the most 
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In four decades, Puerto Rico has gone 
from a model of development to a minefield 
for unwary bond buyers. Currently saddled 
with over $72 billion in debt, nearly four 
times the amount accumulated by Detroit, 
Puerto Rico’s annual debt service is close to 
$4.5 billion. The island’s population has 
shrunk to 3.7 million. Thus, interest alone 
on the public debt exceeds $1,200 per per-
son, a serious burden for a place with barely 
one-third the median household income of 
the United States as a whole.
There are other ways to view this financial 
liability, but none of them makes for a pretty 
picture. Puerto Rico’s public debt equals 
over 70 percent of its GNP. By way of com-
parison, profligate Argentina’s government 
debt is under 50 percent of GNP. 
Not surprisingly, then, Puerto Rico’s 
bond debt was downgraded to junk status by 
all three major ratings agencies in February 
and downgraded further in July. Analysts are 
now debating the possible consequences for 
Wall Street, for tens of thousands of bond-
holders and, of course, for Puerto Ricans. 
One thing on which all agree: Puerto Rico’s 
rocky footing is likely to get rockier.
if it walks and talks like greece…
Until quite recently, Puerto Rico’s unique 
hybrid status as a U.S. territory provided 
more than adequate inducements to lure 
bond buyers. The island’s securities are tri-
ple tax-exempt, so holders do not pay fed-
eral, state or local taxes on their interest in-
come. Government default is also prohibited 
– at least in theory. These attractions, com-
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bined with high ratings (before the fall) and 
a plentiful supply of securities, have 
prompted three-quarters of U.S. municipal 
bond funds to shovel in cash. 
Puerto Rico’s unique status also contrib-
uted to its indebtedness. The high demand 
for its tax-free municipal bonds has histori-
cally kept the cost of borrowing low, lulling 
the government into reliance on long-term 
debt to cover short-term spending. Its need 
to borrow, moreover, is exacerbated by the 
modest size of its tax base. Only Puerto Ri-
cans employed by the U.S. government pay 
income tax on island earnings; others are ex-
empt. To make matters much worse, Puerto 
Rico carries a number of large, unprofitable 
public corporations – notably, water and 
power utilities – on its balance sheets. 
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Puerto Rico’s economy stalled in the late 
20th century, prompting the government to 
step up borrowing in the hope that it could 
spend its way out of the doldrums. But slow 
growth has only morphed to no growth, and 
the overextended government now faces the 
prospect of severe fiscal austerity similar to 
that imposed by the European Union on 
Greece. Like Greece, Puerto Rico’s lack of its 
own currency (and thus its own monetary 
and exchange-rate policies) severely limits 
what the government can do to manage the 
crisis. And just as many debated whether 
Greece would be better off if it left the euro 
zone, there is increasing debate over whether 
it would be in Puerto Rico’s interest to retain 
its current status as a territory, to demand 
statehood or to move toward greater inde-
pendence in some sort of confederation 
with the rest of the United States. 
boom and bust: 1940–2005 
In the mid-1940s, Puerto Rico’s sugar-cane-
based economy was one of the poorest in the 
Caribbean. Since then, its development pro-
gram and economic relationship with the 
mainland have moved through several 
phases, each powered by financial incentives 
designed to make the territory attractive to 
investors. 
In 1948, Washington introduced Opera-
tion Bootstrap, a massive investment cam-
paign aimed at rapidly industrializing the is-
land. It seemed to work: Investment was 
accompanied by innovative economic and 
social programs that for a time won the island 
international praise as a development model.
With Operation Bootstrap, Puerto Rico’s 
ties to the United States were sweetened by 
advantages not available elsewhere in the 
Caribbean. Under the umbrella of U.S. law, 
Puerto Rico offered investors assurances of 
contract and securities law enforcement un-
matched in other parts of the developing 
world. What’s more, this was a period in 
which substantial tariff and quota barriers 
put the U.S. market off limits to other devel-
oping countries. As a result, Puerto Rico en-
joyed enviable advantages as an exporter. 
The island economy grew impressively, 
presaging the awakening of the Asian Tigers 
– South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore. GDP increased by 68 percent in the 
1950s and 90 percent in the 1960s (albeit 
from a fairly low base). By 1970, manufac-
turing constituted a remarkable 40 percent 
of the island’s GDP, and joblessness had de-
clined to 10 percent – astonishing progress 
from a traditional agricultural economy 
with high seasonal unemployment and 
widespread underemployment. For a time, it 
appeared that Puerto Rico’s per capita in-
come might even converge with that of the 
United States.
Since then, however, growth has slowed 
drastically and income convergence has 
been reversed. The reasons are not difficult 
to discover. Unlike most U.S. states, Puerto 
Rico generated much of its electricity by 
burning oil. Thus, the 1973–1974 and 1979 
oil shocks hit the island especially hard. At 
the same time, legislation that gradually ex-
tended the federal minimum wage to Puerto 
Rico and increasing competition from Asia 
eroded both Puerto Rico’s production cost 
advantages and its attraction for corporate 
investors.
A new development phase began with ap-
proval of Section 936 of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code in 1976. Under Sec-
tion 936 (formally, 26 U.S. Code Section 
936), subsidiaries of U.S. corporations oper-
ating manufacturing facilities in Puerto Rico 
received federal tax credits that all but wiped 
out U.S. taxes on their Puerto Rican profits. 
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The tax credits proved a powerful entice-
ment for U.S. corporate investment in 
Puerto Rico, an era in which federal corpo-
rate income taxes took a big bite out of their 
mainland earnings. Indeed, it signaled the 
beginning of an era of creative accounting in 
which companies would scheme to realize 
their profits in tax havens. The island’s man-
ufacturing became more capital-intensive 
and diversified, marked by substantial in-
vestment in pharmaceuticals, medical prod-
ucts, scientific instruments, computers, mi-
croprocessors and electrical goods. 
But in 1996, Congress decided that Sec-
tion 936, which encouraged capital-inten-
sive investment, created too few jobs to jus-
tify the cost in lost tax revenue and repealed 
the law. The island’s industrialization pro-
gram began a gradual decline that eventually 
became a free fall: The 10-year grace period 
on tax advantages for companies operating 
in Puerto Rico at the time of repeal ended in 
December 2005. 
run-up to the crisis
The phaseout of Section 936 revealed the 
downside of Puerto Rico’s territorial status: 
When decisions critical to the territory’s 
prosperity are made in Washington, U.S. 
concerns come first and Puerto Rico’s second. 
Moreover, the creation of Nafta in 1995 al-
lowed Mexico nearly equal U.S. market treat-
ment – treatment that the subsequent estab-
lishment of Cafta-DR extended to include 










Central America and the Dominican Repub-
lic. For the first time since the 1940s, the is-
land’s special status gave it no significant 
competitive advantage over other countries 
in the Americas that were operating at simi-
lar levels of economic development.
Worse was yet to come. The 2008–2009 
international financial crisis and the subse-
quent slowing of the U.S. economy plunged 
the island into depression. Since 2006, Puerto 
Rico’s real GNP is down by 12 percent, with 
no recovery in sight. The island’s investment 
rate, which was around 30 percent of GDP 
in 2001, fell to 13 percent by 2010. 
From 2006 to 2013, Puerto Rico lost 
230,000 jobs in a workforce that numbered 
only 1.2 million. Federal transfer payments 
to Puerto Rican households – a mix of 
safety-net payments ranging from unem-
ployment insurance to food stamps to Social 
Security Disability – increased from 6 per-
cent of personal income in the early 1970s to 
22 percent today. The portion of the popula-
tion living in poverty is now almost three 
times higher in Puerto Rico than on the 
mainland (46 percent versus 16 percent), 
with children and the elderly particularly af-
fected. Moreover, according to the Census 
Bureau, income inequality is higher in 
Puerto Rico than in any U.S. state.  
With jobs scarce and emigration to the 
mainland unrestricted, it should be no sur-
prise that Puerto Ricans have been leaving 
the island in droves. According to the Census, 
about 75,000 Puerto Ricans migrated to the 
mainland in 2012, nearly 46,000 of whom 
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were younger than 35. The Puerto Rico Plan-
ning Board estimates that by 2050, the terri-
tory will lose another 1.3 million, more than 
a third of its current 3.7 million population. 
stuck in the past
Although the onset of Puerto Rico’s current 
economic woes appears at first glance to co-
incide with the revocation of the Section 936 
tax incentives, the island actually began to 
lose its economic edge in the 1970s. Puerto 
Rico failed to adapt to globalization and 
changes in the world economy by switching 
to cheaper fuels to make electricity, by keep-
ing wages low enough to compete with East 
Asian economies and by moving toward a 
more flexible industrial model. As a result, 
the island experienced a prolonged period of 
lethargic growth and ballooning government 
deficits, as every administration after 2001 
issued additional debt rather than tightening 
its belt. Between 2008 and 2013 alone, Puerto 
Rico’s debt increased by 55 percent. 
Given the deteriorating fiscal situation 
and the unlikelihood of a federal bailout, the 
current administration of Alejandro García 
Padilla does not have the luxury of its prede-
cessors to kick the debt can down the road. 
And he knows it: In 2013, Padilla’s first year 
in office, the introduction of several new 
taxes to narrow the government’s deficit her-
alded an era of austerity. 
A cornerstone of the new taxes is the pat-
ente nacional, an additional tax on gross busi-
ness income known elsewhere as a gross re-
ceipts tax. The patente nacional was expected 
to raise roughly $500 million annually, more 
than one-third of projected new revenue for 
the 2014 fiscal year. It covers all businesses 
with gross revenue of at least $1 million, re-
gardless of whether they are profitable. 
The business community has raised an 
outcry, warning that the tax would force 
many firms into bankruptcy. Total island tax 
revenues from July 2013 through April 2014 
were $442 million below expectations, sug-
gesting that many businesses were, indeed, 
unable to raise the necessary cash.
As of late June, there was still uncertainty 
surrounding this fiscal year’s deficit and next 
fiscal year’s budget. Estimated projections 
for the 2014 deficit range from $365 million 
to $1 billion. For a time, the central govern-
ment was without cash or credit, as were 
Puerto Rico’s largest public corporations – 
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 
the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Au-
thority and the Highways and Transporta-
tion Authority – which together are respon-
sible for almost 40 percent of the island’s 
public debt. 
In March, Puerto Rico did manage to float 
$3.5 billion in general obligation bonds, 
enough to service its debts and cover the 
budget deficit through the 2015 fiscal year. 
To the surprise of many, and despite the re-
cent junk status downgrades, the debt issue 
was vastly oversubscribed. Initial yields on 
long-term bonds were as low as 8.7 percent, 
compared with expectations of yields above 
10 percent. Investors’ thirst for immediate in-
come in an era of returns on U.S. Treasuries 
 From 2006 to 2013, Puerto Rico lost 230,000 jobs in a  
workforce that numbered only 1.2 million. The portion  
of the population living in poverty is now almost three 
times higher in Puerto Rico than on the mainland.
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that hardly exceed the rate of inflation ap-
parently worked in the island’s favor. 
But the budget relief looks to be short-
lived. A few months later, the Puerto Rico 
Planning Board projected a fall in GNP of 0.2 
percent for the 2014 fiscal year and 0.7 per-
cent for the 2015 fiscal year, with independent 
economists predicting a revenue contraction 
of 1.5 to 2 percent for 2015. The credit-rating 
agencies were obviously unimpressed in July 
2014, when they downgraded Puerto Rico’s 
bond debt to even lower junk status.
Even optimists are having a hard time spy-
ing a light at the end of the tunnel. The Eco-
nomic Activity Index published by the Gov-
ernment Development Bank showed that the 
economy contracted for the 19th consecutive 
month in April 2014, with the decrease felt 
across sectors. As of April 2014, Puerto Rico’s 
economy employed fewer than one million 
people, with the number of employed having 
decreased by about 25,000 since April 2013. 
At 14.1 percent, the unemployment rate was 
twice that of the mainland. Moreover, that 
figure doesn’t reflect the ballooning numbers 
of discouraged workers who don’t bother to 
register: The labor-force participation rate 
fell below 40 percent for the first time ever.
In late June, the government went into 
full austerity mode with the passage of an 
emergency fiscal law allowing the adminis-
tration to make spending cutbacks necessary 
to achieve a balanced budget. The measure 
will be in place for three years. An extension 
is possible unless three conditions are met: 
• The previous fiscal year must end with a 
balanced budget. 
• A Wall Street credit rating agency must 
peg Puerto Rico’s general obligation bonds 
at investment grade.
• The economic growth forecast must be at 
least 1.5 percent for the upcoming fiscal year. 
The emergency measure was accompanied 
by the governor’s $9.6 billion spending plan 
for the 2015 fiscal year. The plan attempts to 
achieve more than $1.4 billion in cuts and ad-
justments by consolidating 25 government 
agencies and, among other measures, closing 
around 100 public schools. Some $775 mil-
lion is budgeted to amortize debt, $525 mil-
lion more than in the 2014 fiscal year. 
Classic fiscal austerity programs work 
only when the resources released through 
government cutbacks quickly translate into 
private spending to create jobs and private 
income. There is no indication that this will 
be the case in Puerto Rico.
Given the island’s long-stagnant economy, 
threadbare electric power system and large-
scale emigration of its best and brightest, the 
most likely result is a vicious circle in which 
economic contraction accelerates and tax 
revenues shrink faster than government 
spending. Even fiscally conservative organi-
zations like S&P, Moody’s Investors Service 
and Fitch, which for years have been advo-
cating belt-tightening, have warned that 
Puerto Rico’s push for a balanced fiscal 2015 
budget could further weaken its economy. 
Recent research at the International Mon-
Even fiscally conservative  
organizations, which for 
years have been advocating 
belt-tightening, have warned 
that Puerto Rico’s push  
for a balanced fiscal 2015 
budget could further weaken 
its economy. 
a u s t e r i t y  i n  t h e  t r o p i c s
















etary Fund has confirmed the shortcomings 
of similar austerity programs. Specifically, 
the fund warned that the impact of changes 
in government expenditures on GDP is gen-
erally higher than previously estimated, im-
plying that austerity policies can do more 
damage than generally believed. Indeed, a 
report by the IMF’s chief economist, Olivier 
Blanchard, concluded that the fund’s auster-
ity policies in Greece had backfired, making 
a bad situation worse. 
Perhaps in anticipation of potential prob-
lems associated with austerity, the Puerto 
Rican government has introduced legisla-
tion that lays a foundation for the restruc-
turing of a portion of the debt owed by the 
country’s three major public corporations. 
The new law would create an orderly process 
in which to write off $22 billion of the $40 
billion owed by the Puerto Rico Electric, Aq-
ueduct and Sewer and Highways authorities.
Puerto Rico has been relatively lucky so 
far in terms of borrowing power, but the is-
land seems to be drifting into uncharted wa-
ters. Attempts at restructuring the public 
corporation debt could well lead to conta-
gion to other bonds. Some investors already 
worry the new law signals that Puerto Rican 
officials are willing to change the rules to re-
lieve financial stress, making the island’s 
general obligation bonds fair game for re-
structuring, too.
As things now stand, Puerto Rico cannot 
declare bankruptcy, and the island’s consti-
tution stipulates that debt payments on gen-
eral obligation bonds receive priority over 
other spending. Should officials face a choice 
between honoring their bond obligations 
and firing large numbers of public employ-
ees who provide basic services, however, the 
outcome is far from certain. 
Further complicating the situation, a 
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number of hedge funds purchased major 
tranches of the $3.5 billion general obliga-
tion bonds issued in March. If the hedge 
funds choose to exploit Puerto Rico’s finan-
cial desperation, they could further destabi-
lize the investment situation by insisting on 
terms that guarantee them first-lien status in 
the event of a default.
Then there are the hopeless economics of 
Puerto Rico’s public corporations. While the 
corporations are supposed to be fiscally au-
tonomous, they have been subsidized by the 
general fund for years and their employees 
are the best paid on the island. Since political 
pressure has made raising utility rates virtu-
ally impossible, the government may be 
forced in the not-too-distant future to ac-
knowledge that public enterprises are a losing 
proposition that can no longer be tolerated.
Hedge funds are betting on privatization, 
with some already buying the electricity au-
thority’s bonds. The hope is that private op-
erators could run the power plants more effi-
ciently than the government and have some 
leeway to raise rates. Whether the Puerto 
Rican polity will cooperate remains to be seen.
pondering the future
Puerto Rico’s long-term economic prospects 
are complicated by uncertainty about the is-
land’s status within the United States. Is the 
economy more likely to recover and prosper 
under its current territorial status, or with 
statehood, or with some sort of loose con-
federation with the United States? While ad-
vocates can be found for each, Puerto Ricans 
seem fairly evenly split between remaining a 
territory and becoming a state. 
A recent General Accounting Office study 
suggested that Puerto Rico would probably 
receive a net benefit from statehood because 
it would be eligible for $9 billion to $10 bil-
lion in additional federal funding annually. 
But the GAO hedged its position by noting 
that “statehood’s aggregate fiscal impact 
would be influenced greatly by the terms of 
admission, strategies to promote economic 
development, and decisions regarding Puerto 
Rico’s government revenue structure.” 
Puerto Rico’s governor, whose party sup-
ports continued territorial status, argues the 
GAO’s calculations grossly underestimate 
the cost of statehood. According to García 
Padilla, if all residents were subject to federal 
taxes, the burden would turn Puerto Rico 
into a “Latin American ghetto.” In any event, 
it’s worth remembering that the choice of 
statehood is not entirely Puerto Rico’s to 
make: Congressional Republicans wouldn’t 
easily agree to give the heavily Democratic 
island two votes in the Senate and perhaps 
five in the House. 
Puerto Rico’s economic model has tradi-
tionally focused on keeping overhead and 
operating costs low to attract investment, en-
couraging manufacturing and relying on 
abundant federal funding to fill the economic 
potholes. With the public utilities immobi-
lized by debt and island businesses forced to 
pay wages unjustified by productivity gains, 
there is little hope that operating costs can be 
controlled. This alone makes it unlikely that 
U.S. offshore manufacturing will again play a 
dominant role in creating critically needed 
jobs. Moreover, given Washington’s shrink-
ing budgets and the Puerto Rican govern-
ment’s massive debt, there’s simply no chance 
that public spending will fill the gap left by 
the decline of manufacturing. Nor is it even 
remotely likely that the current austerity pro-
gram will spur the sort of recovery needed to 
retain the island’s better talent.
There is, however, a modest source of 
hope. Some local governments are stepping 
in to manage the damage done by Puerto Ri-
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co’s failed economic model. The municipali-
ties of Ponce, Barceloneta and Caguas are 
forging alliances with Puerto Rican business 
groups and mainland-based developers. 
Barceloneta, for example, has invested some 
$13 million in initiatives, including a tech-
nological innovation center to train workers, 
and has fostered business incubators 
to ease the creation of new enter-
prises. In rural areas, municipalities 
hope to pool resources in order to set 
up distribution hubs to deliver pro-
duce to urban markets. As of mid-
2014, around $1.5 billion had flowed 
into these sorts of local projects. 
Moreover, the unique interplay 
between the tax code of the United 
States and that of Puerto Rico still 
gives the island some room to attract 
investment, as evidenced by two laws 
passed by Puerto Rico in 2012. To 
promote the export of services from 
the island and draw new profession-
als, Law 20 reduced the corporate tax 
rate on service export revenue to just 
4 percent. To encourage investors to 
immigrate to the island, Law 22 
eliminates taxes on investment in-
come (with the exception of divi-
dends and interest from U.S. securi-
ties, which are generally taxed by the 
federal government) once their 
Puerto Rican residence is established. 
As of April 2014, Law 22 had already at-
tracted more than 200 wealthy investors in 
search of tax goodies.
With a lot of luck, Puerto Rico may be 
able to build on grassroots development ef-
forts and the new tax incentives to dig its 
way out of a very deep hole. The success of 
this approach depends not only on attract-
ing sufficient investment, but on developing 
and sustaining a strong local economic base 
with market-driven policies and a business-
friendly environment. Puerto Rico’s govern-
ments, both central and local, will also need 
to make development their first priority, 
modernizing the island’s badly worn infra-
structure and carefully targeting education 
to job creation. 
Finally, given that markets, investors and 
prospective residents have all been spooked 
by political and economic uncertainty, it 
would probably make sense for Puerto Rico 
to make peace with its territorial status for 
the foreseeable future. Given the magnitude 
of Puerto Rico’s economic problems, allow-
ing the interminable, contentious argument 
over political status to simmer is a lux-
ury it can ill afford just now.
